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What’s Hot? 
Asteroid Roping? 
Robonaut - spring board to evolve 
new robotic capabilities; operate 
for extended duration, assist with 
tasks, eventually interact w/ crew. 
“Legs” and EVA capability coming 
in 2014-15. 
What’s Hot 2? 
What’s Hot 3? 
REMS 
ChemCam 
MastCam 
RAD 
DAN 
>130 co-investigators 
in seven countries 
MAHLI 
APXS 
Brush / Abrader 
Drill / Sieves 
Scoop 
MARDI 
SAM 
CheMin 
MER (2003)      MPF (1997)          MSL (2012) 
Guided Entry Parachute 
Powered 
Descent Skycrane 
Rover  
Touchdown 
Descent  
Flyaway 
Heatshield Jettison 
The ‘7 Minutes of Terror’* 
*If you have not seen the video, watch it! 
Why? 
How Did We Do? 
Curiosity landed here 
International Space Station 
Facts about ISS 
What do We Do for NASA? 
 Materials             
and         
Processes        
(M&P) 
 Space 
Environments 
and its Effects 
 
Basic Function of M&P 
Materials Selection, Requirements and Certification 
- Verification of Safe Use of Materials 
- Materials Selection for Design  
- Flammability 
- Fracture Control   
- Offgassing (Toxicity/Odor) 
- Fluid Compatibility (Oxygen, Propellants) 
- Corrosion/Stress Corrosion Resistance  
- Outgassing  (Thermal Vacuum Stability/Contamination)       
- Material Analysis/Failure Analysis 
- Materials Process Control/Review  (Manufacturing Processes) 
- Particulate Contamination Control during Ground Build/Processing (FOD) 
- Fracture Control and Pressure Vessel Certification 
 
Flammability and Toxicity 
 
 24.1% oxygen at 14.7 psia established by life 
support system throughout ISS. 
 30% oxygen at 10.2 psia conditions in the US 
Airlock. 
 34% oxygen baseline for the future. 
 Enhanced oxygen testing              
for all new materials. 
 Combustion products or       
offgassing testing for toxins     
at WSTF. 
 
M&P Issue 
Ground Contamination 
M&P Issue 
Flawed Process 
Gold Plating Delamination 
Gold Plated Roll Rings 
M&P Issue 
Process Refinement 
Pre-flight Image Photofoil Label 
On-orbit Image Photofoil Label 
M&P Issue 
Lubrication Issue 
Starboard 
Solar Array 
Rotary Joint 
  
Space Environmental Effects : 
Contamination 
Space Environmental Effects : 
Inadequate Venting 
Space Environmental Effects : 
Inadvertent Materials Substitution 
Battery Box used the ‘wrong’ grade of beta cloth 
Space Environmental Effects : 
Debris Impact 
Space Environmental Effects : 
Operational Result of a  
Probable Debris Impact 
Ionizing Radiation on ISS 
 
 The on–orbit Space Station must perform when 
exposed to the radiation dose environment.  
 Class S parts used extensively in the electrical 
power system (EPS). 
 Mil-883B parts used in the vast majority of ISS 
avionics hardware. 
 High quality and reliability of Mil-883B parts in the 
late 80’s and early 90’s a direct result of the 
automotive industry demands on microelectronics 
producers – not military or aerospace space 
demands. 
 Metrics for Measuring Performance: 
Single Event Effects (SEE)  
Total Ionizing Dose (TID) 

ISS IBM ThinkPad PCS 
Predictions and Results 
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W E
Laptop Predicted (200 MeV box 
level proton testing)  
Reboots/Day (radiation)  
Observed  
Reboots/Day 
(radiation) 
Service Module 
PCS 
0.04 0.02 
Lab Robotics 
Work Station PCS 
0.04 0.01 
Lab PCS 0.04 0.04 
All 0.13 0.08 
Predicted Radiation Induced Anomaly* Rate vs. In-Flight Anomaly Rate for Three 
IBM Thinkpad Laptop 760 XD Computers (PCS) on ISS 
* Anomalies requiring reboot or power cycling for recovery and not attributable to causes other than 
SEE causes 
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Observed PCS Anomalies
>100 MeV Daily Solar Proton Flux
ISS Functional Interrupts 
Equipment acronyms 
 
C&DH 
APS – attached Payload 
Switch 
MDM – Multiplexer-De-
Multiplexer 
C&T Audio 
AIU – Audio Interface Unit 
ATU – Audio Terminal Unit 
AUAI – ACS/UCS Audio 
Interface Unit 
IAC – Internal Audio 
Controller 
RAIU – Russian Audio 
Interface Unit 
 
S-Band 
ACBSP – Assembly and 
Contingency Baseband 
Signal Processor 
Video 
VSW – Video Switch 
 
Ku-Band 
SGTRC – Space-to-Ground 
Transmitter/Receiver 
Controller 
If you want, I can regroup 
by function (C&DH, Audio, 
Video, etc 
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ISS Functional Interupt Anomalies Potentially Caused by Radiation Induced SEE:  2001 - 2011
APS (6) MDM (7) AIU (1) ATU (7)
AUAI (28) IAC (47) RAIU (1) ACBSP (2)
VSW (1) SGTRC (1)
 No hard failures on ISS system hardware in 10 years of 
flight 
 Unscreened or tested payload systems have occasionally    
suffered hard failures 
What’s Next? 
Inflatable Space Modules International Vehicles 
Commercial Resupply 
Orion 
Commercial Crew 
Space Launch System 
Moving Forward 
Back-up 
The Video 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ki_Af_o9Q9s 
